Louis Malek v. Ken Shulsen and Gary Webster : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Louis Malek v. Ken Shulsen and Gary Webster :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Mary C. Corporon; Attorney for Appellant.
Carlie Christensen; Deputy Utah State Attorney General; Attorney for Repsondents.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation




K F U 
45.9 
DOCKET JHOSJ2 




KEN SCHULSEN and GARY WEBSTER, 
Respondents/Respondents. 
District Court No. C 85 2£96 
Supreme Court No. 21052 
Category No. 3 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM THE ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEUS CORPUS IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE HOMER F. 
WILKINSON, JUDGE PRESIDING. 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Plaintitt/Appe[l| 
Suite 1100 - Boston Buildin|g| 
#9 Exchange Place 




Deputy Utah State Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801) 533-7654 
FEB 2 4 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LOUIS MALEK, 
District Court No. C 85 2596 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
-vs- Supreme Court No. 21052 
KEN SCHULSEN and GARY WEBSTER, 
Category No. 3 
Respondents/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
AN APPEAL FROM THE ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S 
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEUS CORPUS IN THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE HOMER F. 
WILKINSON, JUDGE PRESIDING. 
MARY C. CORPORON 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Suite 1100 - Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 328-1162 
CARLIE CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy Utah State Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
(801) 533-7654 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. . . . . 2 
STATEMENT OB CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 5 
POINT I: The State of Utah Board of Pardons has 
violated the provisions of Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 77-27-7 5 
POINT II: Respondents have violated Appellant's 
rights in that Respondents have violated 
Appellant's right to have a hearing on 
the matter of his parole revocation 
within a reasonable period of time, and 
have failed to notify Appellant proper-
ly ot the decision regarding his parole 
revocation 5 
POINT III: The appropriate remedy for the viola-
tion of Appellant's rights which has 
occurred is the release of Appellant 9 
POINT IV: Appellant's action has been timely filed. . . 13 
CONCLUSION 15 
APPENDIX "A" 16 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Beck v. Wilkes, 589 F.2d 901, cert, denied, 
444 U. S. 485 (Ct. App. 5 Ga. 1979) 7 
Carmei v. U. S. Parole Commission, 489 F. Supp. 113 
(So. Disc, of N. Y. 1980). 7 
Moody v. Daggett, 429 U. S. 78 
(1976) . 9, 10 
Morrissey v. Brewer, 308 U. S. 471 
(1972) . . . 6, 7 
Northington v. United States Parole Commission, 
587 F.2d 2 (Ca. 6, 1978) 12 
Smith v. U. S., 577 F.2d 1025 
(Ct. App. 5 Ga. 1978) 7 
United States v. Revis, 525 F.2d 632 
(7th Cir. 1975). 9, 10, 11 
ii 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LOUIS MALEK, 
District Court No. C 85 2596 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
Supreme Court No. 21052 
-vs-
Category No. 3 
KEN SCHULSEN and GARY WEBSTER, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Respondents/Respondents. 
I 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action involves a Petition for Writ of Habeus Corpus 
filed in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County. 
Appellant's petition was filed on or about April 24, 1985. The 
lower court entered an order denying appellant1s petition on or 
about November 6, 1985. The appellant appeals from that order of 
the lower court. 
II 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The appellant's Petition for Writ of Habeus Corpus came on 
for disposition before the lower court pursuant to stipulated 
facts of the parties, and their cross-briefs to the lower court 
as to the issues of law. After the court had reviewed the 
stipulated facts and the parties1 memorandums as to the law, the 
court below denied petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeus 
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Corpus, and entered an amended order to that effect on or about 
November 6, 1985• This judgment was timely appealed by 
petitioner. 
Ill 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment and order below and 
a determination of this Court that appellant is entitled to a 
Writ of Habeus Corpus. 
Appellant further seeks a determination of this Court that 
the lower court erred in ruling that appellant1s Petition for a 
Writ of Habeus Corpus was not timely filed, and was time barred 
pursuant to the terms and conditions of Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 78-12-31.1 (1979) and a determination that the lower 
court erred in ruling that appellant's application should be 
denied for reason that he was not prejudiced by the delay in 
having his parole revocation heard. 
IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following statement of facts is taken from the parties' 
stipulation as to the relevant facts which was filed with the 
lower court on or about August 23, 1985: 
Appellant, Louis Malek, is presently incarcerated at the 
Utah State Prison. He was previously committed to the Utah State 
Prison on May 18, 1977, after entering a plea of guilty to the 
charge of manslaughter in the Third Judicial District Court in 
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Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, 
Judge presiding. Appellant was conditionally released by the 
Board of Pardons of the State of Utah on parole on May 11, 1982. 
On or about February 28, 1983, appellant was arrested and 
incarcerated in the Utah County Jail upon charges that he had 
committed the crimes of aggravated robbery and attempted murder. 
On March 18, 1985, an order and warrant ot arrest was issued by 
the Board of Pardons of the State of Utah upon a Complaint made 
to the Board of Pardons that appellant had violated the terms and 
conditions of his parole, and appellant was served with this 
warrant. Appellant requested a pre-revocation hearing before the 
Board of Pardons which was scheduled for March 18, 1983. 
Directly prior to the pre-revocation hearing, appellant elected 
to waive his pre-revocation hearing and he signed a waiver of his 
pre-revocation hearing on March 18, 1983. Appellant was found 
guilty of the charges of aggravated robbery and attempted murder 
in the Fourth District Court on July 8, 1983, and on this date, 
appellant was remanded to the custody of the Utah State Prison to 
serve a prison sentence which had been imposed by the Fourth 
District Court. The State of Utah Board of Pardons scheduled 
appellant to appear before the Board of Pardons for a parole 
violation hearing on May 23, 1984. Notice of this hearing was 
mailed to appellant at the Utah State Prison by the Board of 
Pardons on May 17, 1984. Between July 8, 1983 and May 23, 1984, 
the State ot Utah Board of Pardons took no action to schedule the 
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appellant's parole revocation hearing before the State of Utah 
Board of Pardons, and took no action to adjudicate the issue of 
the appellant's alleged parole violation before the State of Utah 
Board of Pardons. Appellant objected to the Board ot Pardons 
hearing scheduled for May 23, 1984, alleging that he did not have 
adequate notice of this parole violation hearing. He requested a 
continuance of this hearing and the matter of his parole 
violation was continued to July 25, 1984. The State of Utah 
Board ot Pardons entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
an Order on January 8, 1985, finding that appellant did, in fact, 
violate his parole, and revoking appellant's parole which had 
been granted in 1982. A re-hearing on the matter of appellant's 
parole was scheduled tor July of 1988. 
On April 24, 1985, appellant petitioned the Third Judicial 
District Court in and for Salt Lake County for issuance of a Writ 
of Habeus Corpus, alleging that appellant was illegally 
restrained in violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-27-11 
and in violation of his rights to due process and equal 
protection and his rights to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment. 
Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Habeus Corpus was denied, 
and a final order denying his Petition tor a Writ of Habeus 
Corpus was signed and entered by the lower court on November 6, 





POINT I: THE STATE OF UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS HAS 
VIOLATED THE PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE 
ANNOTATED, SECTION 77-27-7. 
The portion of Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-27-7 which is 
applicable to the instant case reads as follows: 
(1) The Board of Pardons shall determine within 
six months after the date of an offender's commitment 
for a felony offense, a date upon which the offender 
shall be afforded a hearing to establish a date of 
release or a date for rehearing, and shall promptly 
notify the offender of the date. 
Louis Malek is clearly an "offender" within the meaning of 
Section 77-27-7. He was committed to the Utah State Prison for a 
felony offense on or about July 8, 1983. Pursuant to the terms 
and conditions of this statute, appellant was entitled to a date 
from the Board of Pardons upon which the appellant would be 
afforded a hearing to establish a release date or a date for a 
hearing, and he was entitled to receive this date no later than 
January 8, 1984. Appellant was not notified of any hearing date 
until May ot 1984, and he was not actually given a hearing until 
July of 1984, over six months after he was entitled to such a 
hearing. He was not given a date ot release or a date for 
rehearing until January, 1985, almost 18 months after he was 
entitled to receive such a release date or re-hearing date. 
Moreover, appellant was entitled to be notified promptly of 
the decision of the Board regarding his release date or 
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re-hearing date. Even though he went before the Board in July of 
1984, he was not notified of the decision of the Board until 
January of 1985, six month after his hearing date. 
Clearly, the Board has violated both the six month hearing 
and the prompt notification requirements of Section 77-27-7. 
POINT II: RESPONDENTS HAVE VIOLATED APPELLANT'S 
RIGHTS IN THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE VIOLATED 
APPELLANT'S RIGHT TO HAVE A HEARING ON THE 
MATTER OF HIS PAROLE REVOCATION WITHIN A 
REASONABLE PERIOD OF TIME, AND HAVE FAILED TO 
NOTIFY APPELLANT PROPERLY OF THE DECISION 
REGARDING HIS PAROLE REVOCATION. 
The section of the Utah Code Annotated which deals with the 
matter of parole revocation is Utah Code Annotated, Section 
77-27-11. (See Appendix "A" to this brief for a full text of the 
statute.) This statute sets torth the procedure which must be 
followed by the Board in order to revoke the parole of a parolee. 
The statute does not provide a time limit during which the Board 
must conduct a hearing regarding the parolee's revocation of 
parole. However, it does state in subsection (5) that "the 
parolee shall be promptly notified in writing of the Board's 
findings and decision [regarding parole revocation]." 
Since the Utah Code does not provide a time limit during 
which a final parole revocation hearing must be held, then common 
law regarding the rights of due process which must be afforded to 
parolees will govern. 
A parolee's due process rights were established in the 
United States Supreme Court decision of Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 
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U.S. 471 (1972). In the Morrissey decision, the Supreme Court 
stated: 
There must also be an opportunity for a hearing if it 
is desired by the parolee prior to the final decision 
on revocation by the parole authority. This hearing 
must be the basis for more than determining probable 
cause; it must lead to a final evaluation of any 
contested relevant facts in consideration of whether 
the facts as determined warrant revocation. . . . The 
revocation hearing must be tendered within a reasonable 
time after the parolee is taken into custody. A lapse 
of two months, as respondents suggest occurrs in some 
cases, would not appear to be unreasonable. (emphasis 
added.) (At pages 487 and 488.) 
Subsequent to the Morrissey decision, the Federal courts 
have established that it is per se reasonable to conduct a parole 
revocation hearing within 90 days of the date a parolee is taken 
into custody, and that it is per se unreasonable to have a parole 
revocation hearing more than 90 days after the parolee is taken 
into custody. See, for example, Carmel v. U. S. Parole 
Commission, 489 F. Supp. 113 (So. Dist. of N. Y. 1980); Smith v. 
U. S., 577 F.2d 1025 (Ct. App. 5 Ga. 1978); Beck v. Wilkes, 589 
F.2d 901, cert, denied, 444 U. S. 485 (Ct. App. 5 Ga. 1979). 
Where the rights of parolees are concerned, Utah State 
guarantees of due process should be interpretted identically to 
the Federal guarantees of due process. 
In the instant case, appellant was "taken into custody" with 
regard to his alleged parole violation when the Board issued its 
order and warrant of arrest on March 18, 1983. Federal and State 
due process requirements mandated that appellant have a hearing 
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on the matter of his parole revocation within three months of 
that date, oxr by June 18, 1983. 
The Board of Pardons continued the hearing on appellant's 
parole revocation pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings 
against appellant in the Fourth District Court of Provo, Utah, 
Those Utah County proceedings were terminated effective July 8, 
1983, when appellant was found guilty of the charges against him 
and committed to the custody of the Utah State Prison, Even 
assuming that the 90 day time period did not begin to elapse 
until appellant was committed to the Utah State Prison by the 
courts of Utah County, the Board was still under an obligation to 
have a hearing as to the issue of his parole revocation no later 
than October 8, 1983. The hearing was not scheduled until May of 
1984, and was not actually held until July of 1984, over nine 
months past the time when the Board was constitutionally required 
to hold such a hearing. 
Furthermore, the Board did not notify appellant of its 
decision on his parole revocation until January of 1985, six 
months after the hearing date. This was an unreasonable time to 
delay in notifying appellant of the Board's decision, and 
constituted violation of Utah Code Annotated, Section 
77-27-11(5). 
The respondents have violated both appellant's due process 
rights at common law, and his right pursuant to Utah statute to 
be notified within a reasonable time period of a decision of the 
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Board regarding his parole revocation. 
POINT III: THE APPROPRIATE REMEDY FOR THE VIOLATION 
OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS WHICH HAS OCCURRED 
IS THE RELEASE OF APPELLANT. 
The only appropriate remedy appellant is release. To give 
appellant any less than this remedy is to afford appellant rights 
without any remedy for breach of those rights. To give appellant 
any less than this remedy is to render the entire section of the 
Utah Code Annotated dealing with the Board of Pardons 
meaningless. 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of United 
States v. Revis, 525 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1975) held that a delay 
in the revocation hearing for a parolee mandated the release of 
the parolee pursuant to his Writ of Habeus Corpus. The court in 
Revis stated as follows: 
[T]o order anything less than petitioner's release from 
the restraint of the violation warrant would be to 
provide petitioner a right without a remedy, the 
Federal courts have recognized that unjustified delay 
in providing a revocation hearing requires the issuance 
of a Writ of Habeus Corpus. See e.g. United States ex 
rel Buono v. Kenton, 287 F.2d 534, 536 (2d Cir. 1961) ; 
Sutherland v. District of Columbia Board of Parole, 366 
F. Supp. 270, 273 (DDC 1974); United States ex rel 
Hitchcock v. Kenton, 256 F. Supp. 296, 301 (D. Conn. 
1966). (At page 639.) 
Respondents may argue that Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78 
(1976) is controlling in this instance for the proposition that 
appellant was not constitutionally entitled to a speedy hearing 
on the matter of his parole revocation. The facts of the Moody 
are easily distinguishable from the instant case. In Moody, the 
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appellant had been released on parole and had committed two 
homicides which were alleged to constitute a violation of his 
parole and had been convicted of two additional felony counts for 
the homicides in addition to the underlying charges which had 
given rise to his parole. In Moody, the parole board elected not 
to serve the appellant with a warrant of arrest for his alleged 
parole violation and instead elected to allow the appellant Moody 
to serve his sentence for the two homicides before the parole 
board there considered the matter of his parole revocation. The 
Moody court held that the appellant was not entitled to a hearing 
on the matter of his parole revocation within a set period of 
time, and held that the parole board could delay service of the 
warrant for parole revoction pending completion of the second 
prison sentence. 
In the case at bar, the Utah State Board of Pardons elected 
to serve the warrant of arrest for the parole revocation upon 
appellant Malek in March of 1983. Since the Board elected to 
serve the arrest warrant, they became obligated to afford 
appellant due process in carrying out the results of issuing and 
serving that warrant. 
It should be noted that the Revis decision, supra, was later 
reversed by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in reliance upon 
the Moody decision for reason that the facts of the Revis case 
were identical to the facts of the Moody v. Daggett case. The 
Revis court reversed itself on the issue of liability, not on the 
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question of the appropriate remedy if liability had been found. 
The Revis holding that release is an appropriate remedy for 
violation of a parolee's rights to due process still stands. 
Respondents have also argued, and the lower court has found, 
that appellant is obligated to show both a violation of his 
rights to due process and prejudice because of that violation 
before the court may grant him the remedy of release. The lower 
court has erred in imposing this two-fold obligation upon the 
appellant and has erred in finding that appellant has not been 
prejudiced by the delay in affording him the hearings to which he 
was entitled. 
It is the position of the Federal courts that a petitioner 
for a Writ of Habeus Corpus is obligated to show both a violation 
of his rights to due process and prejudice because of that 
violation before a court may grant him the remedy of release. 
This position of the Federal courts has been taken in 
interpreting 18 United States Code, Section 4214 which was 
enacted in 1976. This Federal statute sets the "reasonable time" 
during which a parole revocation hearing must be held to be 90 
days. In the Federal system, various courts have considered 
whether or not release of an inmate is an appropriate remedy for 
violation of this 90 day period. Numerous Federal courts have 
held that an inmate must show both violation of Section 4214 and 
prejudice as a result of that violation before an inmate may be 
released upon a Writ of Habeus Corpus. However, the Federal 
11 
courts, in reaching this decision, have relied upon the 
legislative history of Section 4214 which reveals that it was not 
the intention of the United States Congress to authorize the 
release of inmates for violation of this code section. See, for 
example, Northington v. United States Parole Commission, 587 F.2d 
2 (Ca. 6, 1978). 
Apellant Malek's Petition for a Writ of Habeus Corpus is not 
predicated upon United States statute, but is predicated on 
federal and state guarantees of due process and upon Utah state 
statute. Therefore, the legislative history of 18 United States 
Code, Section 4214 is not applicable to the case of the 
appellant, and Federal court decisions which held that an inmate 
whose parole revocation hearing is not held within 90 days of the 
date of arrest must show actual prejudice in order to gain 
release are not applicable. 
Further, the delay which has occurred in appellant's case is 
not a delay of a mere week or month or even several months. The 
delay in this case is in excess of nine months, and this court 
should find prejudice per se in delaying a revocation hearing for 
a period of nine months. During such a lengthy delay, it is only 
reasonable that appellant would be prejudiced by loss of 
witnesses, fading memories and the disability of incarceration in 
preparing his hearing before the Board. Further, appellant has 
suffered prejudice caused by the mental anguish and stress of 
incarceration without knowing exactly the terms of that 
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incarceration or the time when that incarceration will end. 
POINT IV: APPELLANT'S ACTION HAS BEEN TIMELY FILED. 
Respondents have contended that appellant's petition was not 
timely filed, and the lower court so found. This decision on the 
part of the lower court was error and should be reversed by this 
court. 
The statute in issue is Utah Code Annotated, Section 
78-12-31.1 (1979), which reads as follows: 
[WJithin three months: for relief pursuant to a Writ 
of Habeus Corpus. This limitation shall apply not only 
as to grounds known to petitioner, but also to grounds 
which in the exercise of reasonable diligence should 
have been known by petitioner or counsel for 
petitioner. 
Respondents have contended that appellant Malek knew he had 
not had a parole revocation within 90 days of his being taken 
into custody by no later than October 8, 1983. They will assert 
that the statute of limitations thus ran on his petition as to 
the timeliness of his parole revocation hearing no later than 
January 8, 1984. Further, they will contend that appellant knew 
the six month time period for a hearing date on his new felony 
conviction passed on January 8, 1984, and that his statute of 
limitations on this issue thus ran out on April 8, 1984. 
Respondents' and the lower court's interpretation of Section 
78-12-31.1 is in error. First, it fails to account for Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 78-12-36 (1975), which states as follows: 
If a person entitled to bring an action, other 
than for recovery of real property, is at the time the 
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cause of action accrued, either: 
• • • • 
. . . (3) imprisoned on a criminal charge or in 
execution under the sentence of a criminal court for a 
term less than for life;--
the time of such disability is not a part of the 
time limited for the commencement of the action. 
Appellant meets all requirements of Section 78-12-36 for 
tolling of the statute of limitations in question. He has been 
imprisoned on criminal charges and/or under the sentence of a 
criminal court continuously since February, 1983, well before his 
cause of action arose in this case. Since he is incarcerated for 
indeterminant sentences from the Third and Fourth District 
Courts, he is serving a sentence for a term less than life. 
Hence, the statute of limitations had not even begun to run 
against appellant when he commenced this action. 
Second, even ignoring Section 78-12-36, respondents 
mischaracterized the limitation imposed by Section 78-12-31.1. 
Appellant has suffered a continuing violation of his rights to 
due process and a continuing violation of the statutes of the 
State of Utah each and every day he has been incarcerated since 
the time he should have been granted a hearing in 1983 or 1984. 
Because appellant1s problem is a continuing one, each day has 
given rise to a new cause of action and a new period of 
limitation. For this continuing violation of appellant's rights, 




For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the lower court 
should be reversed, and appellant's Writ of Habeus Corpus should 
be granted, authorizing the release forthwith of appellant. 
DATED THIS f3 day of /£^/ru,*^V 1986. 
CORPORON & WILLIAMS 
:ORPO| 
f o c ^ w p e l l a n t 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I caused to be served upon respondents 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellate Brief, 
including any attachments, by hand-delivering the same to: 
CARLIE CHRISTENSEN 
Attorney tor Respondents 
Attorney General's Office 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
on the f*% daY °f February, 1986. 
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APPENDIX "A" 
77-27-11. Revocation of parole. (1) The board may revoke 
the parole ot any person who is found to have violated condition 
of his parole. 
(2) If a parolee is detained by the Department of 
Corrections or any law enforcement official for a suspected 
violation of parole, the Department of Corrections shall 
immediately report the alleged violation to the board, by means 
of incident report, and make any recommendation regarding the 
incident. No parolee may be held for a period longer than 72 
hours, excluding weekends and holidays without first obtaining a 
warrant. 
(3) Any member of the board may issue a warrant based upon 
a certified warrant request to a peace officer or other persons 
authorized to arrest, detain and return to actual custody a 
parolee, and may upon arrest or otherwise direct the Department 
of Corrections to determine if there is probably cause to believe 
the parolee has violated the conditions of his parole. 
(4) Upon a finding of probable cause, a parolee may be 
further detained or imprisoned again pending a hearing by the 
board. 
(5) The board shall conduct a hearing on the alleged 
violation of parole, and a statement of the evidence against him. 
Te board shall provide the parolee the opportunity to be present, 
be represented by counsel, to be heard, to present witnesses and 
documentary evidence, and to contront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses, absent a showing of good cause for not allowing the 
controntation. Decisions shall be reached by majority vote of 
the members of the board sitting and the parolee shall be 
promptly notified m writing of the board1s finding and decision. 
(6) Parolees found to have violated the conditions of 
parole may, at the discretion of the board, be returned to 
parole, have restitution ordered, or be imprisoned again as 
determined by the board, not to exceed the maximum term, or be 
subject to any other conditions the board may impose within its 
discretion. 
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